Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 5
Issue 1 Winter 1974

Article 8

1974

Catch-269
Cynthia Kappus

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons
Recommended Citation
Cynthia Kappus, Catch-269, 5 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 166 (1974).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol5/iss1/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Catch-269
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that
were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr
was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask;
and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would
have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly
them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he
didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved
very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22
and let out a respectful whistle.
Joseph Heller--CATCH-22

One of the Catch-22's of the Internal Revenue Code1 is section
269.2 The section provides that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
may disallow a deduction claimed by a taxpayer who has acquired control of a corporation for the principal purpose of securing a tax deduction, claim or benefit not otherwise available.' In other words, in
1. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954 [hereinafter cited as INT. REV. CODE].
2. INT. REV. CODE § 269 [hereinafter cited as section 269] originally appeared
as section 129 of the INTrNrrAL REVENUE CODE of 1939. It was passed by the Congress
as section 128(a) of the Revenue Act of 1943, 58 Stat. 21. The section was renumbered and substantially amended in 1954. The amendments are discussed in detail
on pages 174-175 infra.
3. Section 269 says:
§ 269. Acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax.
(a) In general.
(1) any person or persons acquire, or acquired on or after October 8,
1940, directly or indirectly, control of a corporation, or
(2) any corporation acquires, or acquired on or after October 8, 1940,
directly, or indirectly, property of another corporation, not controlled,
directly or indirectly, immediately before such acquisition, by such acquiring corporation or its stockholders, the basis of which property, in
the hands of the acquiring corporation, is determined by reference to
the basis in the hands of the transferor corporation,
and the principal purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduction,
credit, or other allowance which such person or corporation would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary or his delegate may disallow such deduction,
credit, or other allowance. For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), control
means the ownership of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total combined voting power of all clas6es of stock entitled to vote or at least 50 per-
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order to obtain the benefits of certain tax deductions you must organize
your affairs to comply with the requirements for those deductions. But
if you organize your affairs principally to take advantage of the deduction, the Internal Revenue Service may disallow the deduction. The
statute causes concern to tax planners and business decision makers
and has frequently been the subject of litigation. 4 Much of the litigation has involved tax benefits such as pre-acquisition loss carryovers 5
or multiple surtax exemptions. 6 In applying section 269 to these benecent of the total value of shares of all classes of stock of the corporation.
(b) Power of Secretary or his delegate to allow deduction, etc., in part.
In any case to which subsection (a) applies the Secretary or his delegate
is authorized(1) to allow as a deduction, credit, or allowance any part of any
amount disallowed by such subsection, if he determines that such allowance will not result in the evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax
for which the acquisition was made; or
(2) to distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, and distribute,
apportion, or allocate the deductions, credits, or allowances the benefit
of which was sought to be secured, between or among the corporations,
or properties, or parts thereof, involved, and to allow such deductions,
credits, or allowances so distributed, apportioned, or allocated, but to
give effect to such allowance only to such extent as he determines will
not result in the evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax for which
the acquisition was made; or
(3) to exercise his powers in part under paragraph (1) and in part
under paragraph (2).
(c)
Presumption in case of disproportionate purchase price.
The fact that the consideration paid upon an acquisition by any person or
corporation described in subsection (a) is substantially disproportionate to
the aggregate(1) of the adjusted basis of the property of the corporation (to the
extent attributable to the interest acquired specified in paragraph (1) of
subsection (a)), or of the property acquired specified in paragraph (2)
of subsection (a); and
(2) of the tax benefits (to the extent not reflected in the adjusted
basis of the property) not available to such person or corporation otherwise than as a result of such acquisition,
shall be prima facie evidence of the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance
of Federal income tax. This subsection shall apply only with respect to acquisitions after March 1, 1954. (Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 80; Feb. 26,
1964, Pub. L. 88-272, title II, § 235(c)(2), 78 Stat. 126.)
4. According to records kept by the Department of the Treasury during the period
of July 1967 through March 1973 there were seventy-five reported decisions in cases
involving section 269. The Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter cited as the Service]
won forty of them, lost twenty-six and there was a split decision in the other nine.
Eleven cases involved loss carryovers. Of these the Service won eight and lost three.
Sixteen cases involved denial of the multiple surtax exemption. Of these the Service
won eight, lost four and had a split decision of four. There were thirty-four cases
involving the principal purpose test with the Service winning eighteen, losing thirteen,
and splitting three decisions. Letter from John H. Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Department of the Treasury, to Senator Charles H. Percy, October 31, 1973.
5. INT. REV. CODE § 172 defines net operating losses and provides that losses incurred in one year may be carried over to subsequent years. § 1212 provides rules
for the carryover of capital losses as defined in § 1222, § 381 and § 382 specifically
deal with loss carryovers in the context of acquisitions and reorganiations.
6. IrT. REV. CODE § 11 imposes a surtax on all corporations. § 11(d) provides
a $25,000 exemption for each corporate taxpayer. § 1562 provides that a commonly
controlled group of corporations can elect to file separate returns with each member
corporation receiving a separate surtax exemption. Because of continuing abuses the
Congress repealed § 1562 in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, P.L. 91-172, effective December 31, 1974.
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fits the courts have left the taxpayer very narrow ground from which
to challenge application of the statute. 7 However, where the Service
has enlisted section 269 to disallow other deductions, such as postacquisition net operating losses, some circuits have added to the taxpayer's defenses consideration of the relationship between section 269
and the legislative purpose for the deduction being disallowed. 8 Because the circuits have divided9 on the issue of whether section 269
may be enlisted to disallow post-acquisition net operating loss deductions, the division may be ripe for resolution by the United States Supreme Court. 10 There may also be a Congressional review since the
Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation has recommended
amendment of section 269.11 This note will try to thread together the
history of section 269 into a framework for understanding the issues
that would be involved in either a Supreme Court or a Congressional
review of section 269.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT-THE PROBLEM

At the beginning of the Second World War Congress enacted the excess profits tax.12 Given the natural motivation of business to protect
profits, Congress foresaw efforts to limit tax burdens under the new
law. Profits were soaring in those industries affected by the surge
of demand that accompanied war. One of the most obvious ways
to limit tax burdens without cutting into profits was to purchase someone else's tax deductions. The waning Depression had provided ample opportunity for such schemes. Corporate capital and operating
losses during the Depression had been immense and widespread.
Many insolvent businesses with unused tax losses were available for
7. A typical statement of these grounds is found in Vulcan Metals Co. v. United
States, 446 F.2d 690, 696-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942, rehearing denied,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971):
[W]e are concerned With two lines of inquiry: (a) whether there has been
an acquisition of control as contemplated by section 269, and, if so, (b)
whether the principal purpose of the merger was to evade or avoid taxes.
8. The Sixth Circuit in Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 507
(6th Cir. 1964), and the Third Circuit in Herculite Protective Fabrics Corp. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1968), have held that post-acquisition net operating
loss deductions may not be disallowed under section 269. These cases are discussed in
detail on pages 180 and 182 infra.
9. The First, Second, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have sustained section 269
disallowance of post acquisition operating loss deductions. The cases are discussed in
detail on pages 178-182 infra.
10. Hereinafter cited as the Supreme Court.
11. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation introduced legislation to
repeal certain obsolete and rarely used provislons. It provided for repeal of section
269(c). No action was taken by the House Ways and Means Committee. H.R. 25,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 150 (1971).
12. Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 975 (1940).
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sale at bargain prices. The prospect of corporate taxpayers offsetting
the billions in Depression losses against the profits of the war years posed
a serious threat to the revenue-raising potential of the excess profits
tax. What Congress needed was a mechanism to protect the revenue
without interfering in the reorganization of business resources that was
inevitable and healthy as the country moved from depression to war. 1
HISTORICAL CONTEXT-THE SOLUTION

The legislative solution was section 269. The legislative history is
very explicit about the purpose of the statute. The House Ways and
Means Committee stated in its report:
This section is designed to put an end promptly to any market for
or dealings in, interests in corporations or property which have as
their objective the reduction
through artifice of the income or ex4
cess profits tax liability.'
The Senate Finance Committee restated the purpose of section 269 in
its report:
The objective of the section, as stated in the report on the House
Bill, is to prevent the distortion through tax avoidance of the deduction, credit, or allowance provisions of the Code, particularly
those of the type represented by the recently developed practice
of corporations with large excess profits (or the interests controlling such corporations) acquiring corporations with current, past,
or prospective losses or deductions, deficits, or current or unused

excess profits credits,
for the purpose of reducing income and ex5
cess profits taxes.1

Congress was aware of the difficulty of formulating a statutory
mechanism for achieving its purpose 6 and turned for guidance to a
group of contemporaneous Supreme Court cases 1 7 involving tax reduction through adroit use of corporate identities. The Senate Finance
Committee was explicit 8 about its intention to codify the principle of
13. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 16-29 (3d ed. 1971).
14. H.R. REP. No. 871, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), 1944 CuM. BULL. 901, 938.
15. S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), 1944 CUM. BULL. 973, 1016.
16. Id. at 1016:
Your committee also recognizes the difficulty of formulating a proper general
provision which will be helpful in administration and decision in distinguishing between business conduct which effectuates the basic purposes of the deduction, credit, and allowance provisions of the code and arrangements which
distort, pervert, and defeat such basic purposes.
17. The House and Senate Reports cite: Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935); Griffiths v .Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S.
473 (1940); United States v. Joliet & Chicago Ry. Co., 315 U.S. 446 (1942); Moline
Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1942); Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943).
18. S. REP. No. 627, supra note 15 at 1016.
[Tihe legal effect of the section is, in large, to codify and emphasize the
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Higgins v. Smith1 9 that it is the substance not the form of a transaction
that determines tax incidence.20 The Committee also cites Gregory
v. Helvering.21 This case articulates the "substantial business purpose" doctrine that mere compliance with the code provisions allowing
a tax benefit is enough only when there is, independent of tax consequences, a substantial business or economic purpose.1 2 Primarily concerned about trafficking in tax benefits, the Committee also cites GrifIiths v. Commissioner.23 This case states that benefits, like income,
must be attributed to the economic entity that earned them.24 These
concepts constitute the legal theory upon which section 269 was constructed.

The problem was serious, the legislative purpose was explicit, and
the legal theory of section 269 was a codification of decisions of the
Supreme Court. The drafting Committees were, however, aware of
three difficulties their statutory mechanism would have to overcome.
First, it would have to be sufficiently flexible to deal with the complex
and varied forms in which corporate acquisitions occur. 25 Second, it
would have to effectively distinguish between tax avoidance schemes
and bona fide business transactions.2 6 Third, section 269 would have
to be designed to operate without distorting the legislative plans of
the other code sections allowing deductions and benefits.
Congress
general principle set forth in Higgins v. Smith and in other judicial decisions
as to the ineffectiveness of arrangements distorting or perverting deductions,
credits or allowances so that they no longer bear a reasonable business relationship to the interests or enterprises which produced them and for the benefit
of which they were provided.
19. 308 U.S. 473 (1940).
20. Id. at 477:
The purpose here is to tax earnings and profits less expenses and losses. If
one or the other factor in any calculation is unreal, it distorts the liability of
the particular taxpayer to the detriment or advantage of the entire tax-paying
group.
. . [T]he government may not be required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's
election of that form for doing business which is most advantageous to him.
The government may look at actualities and upon determination that the
form employed for doing business or carrying out the challenged tax event is
unreal or a sham may sustain or disregard the effect of the fiction as best
serves the purpose of the tax statutes.
21. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
22. Id. at 469.
23. 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
24. Id. at 358. SeealsoLucasv. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
25. H.R. REP. No. 871, supra note 14 at 938:
mhe section has not confined itself to a description of any particular methods for carrying out such tax avoidance schemes but has included within its
scope these devices in whatever form they may appear.
26. See supra note 16.
27. S. REP. No. 627, supra note 15 at 1017:
To determine what transactions constitute the condemned evasion or avoidance, section (269) must be read in its context and background. It is superimposed on the several existing provisions of the income and excess profits tax law. . . . It is nonconformity to the basic policies of these provisions
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believed it had designed a mechanism that could meet these tests.
The litigation provides some evidence of how well section 269 has accomplished its purpose and overcome these difficulties.
FLEXIBILITY

Section 269 has clearly demonstrated that it is sufficiently flexible
to reach a wide variety of transactions. The question of what constitutes an "acquisition" within the reach of section 269 has been extensively litigated. In an early case, Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Commissioner,2 the United States Tax Court 29 suggested that section 269
could reach only deductions claimed by an acquiring corporation, not

those claimed by an acquired corporation . 0

Because an acquirer can

assume the corporate identity of the acquired corporation by a quick
shuffle of papers, 1 subsequent decisions3 2 have discredited the dicta of
Alprosa Watch. These cases clearly hold that for purposes of section
269 there is no distinction between an acquired and an acquiring

taxpayer.

33

Another skirmish over the term "acquisition" was decided in favor
of broad construction in the cases challenging the application of section
269 to the disallowance of multiple surtax exemptions. In James Realof the code which is denoted by tax avoidance in section (269), and it is in
the light of these basic policies that section (269) would necessarily have to
be applied and administered. . . . The test of this nonconformity is . . .
whether the transaction or a particular factor thereof "distorts the liability
of the particular taxpayer" when the "essential nature" of the transaction or
factor is examined in the light of the "legislative plan."
28. 11 T.C. 240 (1948).
29. Hereinafter cited as the Tax Court.
30. 11 T.C. at 245.
31. An example is found in Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 744
In this case the taxpayer pur(2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965).
chased two other corporations. The two acquired corporations were consolidated into
the loss corporation which then assumed the name of the profit maker. In this way
the survivor was technically the loss corporation.
32. See, e.g., Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957);
Mill Ridge Coal Co. v. Patterson, 264 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 861
(1959), rehearing denied, 363 U.S. 832 (1960); Commissioner v. British Motor Car
Dist. Ltd., 278 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1960); James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d
394 (8th Cir. 1960); Thomas E. Snyder Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 36 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); Urban Redevelopment Corp. v. Commissioner,
294 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1961); Southland Corp. v .Campbell, 358 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.
1966).
33. There is one situation in which it still does make a difference whether the
taxpayer in an acquiring or acquired corporation. In Kolker Brothers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 299 (1960), the Tax Court allowed a loss carryover and suggested that
a taxpayer engaged in a losing business should be encouraged, not penalized, for getting himself out of the losing business and into a profitable one through acquisition.
The same point was discussed by the Second Circuit in Norden-Ketay v. Commissioner,
319 F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1963). In a subsequent Revenue Ruling (Rev. Rul. 6340, 1963-1 CUm. BULL. 46) the Service announced its intention not to apply section
269 where a loss corporation acquires a profitable business and there is "little or no"
change in the ownership of the loss corporation.
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ty Co. v. United States14 the taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that incorporation was not an "acquisition" within the reach of section 269.
Buttressed by the express Congressional mandate that section 269 be
used to prevent abuse of the multiple surtax exemption, 35 the government successfully argued that initial incorporation 6 is an "acquisition"
within the reach of section 269.
The courts have narrowly construed section 269 only where its
terms are precisely drawn. For example, the statute defines "control"
as ownership of stock constituting either 50 per cent of the value or 50
per cent of the voting power of all classes of stock. 37 The courts have
willingly considered an increase in stock ownership that carried the
acquirer over the 50 per cent mark as an acquisition for purposes of
the statute.38 They have not sustained application of the statute if the
taxpayer does not actually own a controlling interest.3 9
The litigation has confirmed the Congressional expectation that
section 269 would be broad and flexible enough to deal with the complex forms in which corporate acquisitions occur. The problem is
whether, having encompassed such a range of transactions within its
reach, section 269 fairly and consistently distinguishes allowable
from disallowable tax benefits. One aspect of this problem is the focus
of section 269 on the motive of the taxpayer. The inherent difficulty
in determining tax liability on the basis of a subjective standard is the
subject of an ongoing debate, 40 and section 269 has long been a target
of those who favor objective rather than subjective standards.
34.

280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960).

35.

INT. REV. CODE § 1551(c) provides:

The provisions of section 269(b), and the authority of the Secretary under such
section, shall, to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this section, be applicable to this section.
36. 280 F.2d at 398.
37. § 269(a) at supra note 3.

38.

In Southland Corp. v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1966) the court

held that the purchase of a few shares of stock that increased the taxpayer's share

of ownership from 49.9 to 50.4 percent could constitute an "acquisition" within the
reach of section 269.
39. In one such case, Maxwell Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 714, 721
(9th Cir. 1965), a real estate developer incorporated his business by purchase of non-

voting stock in Maxwell Hardware Corp. in an amount equal to about two-fifths of
the value of the outstanding common stock. Operating as a division of the hardware
company, the real estate developer protected his interests by requiring that all common
stock be placed in trust in a bank obliged as trustee to elect him to the three person
board of directors. These arrangements gave him operating control of the business,
but the court held that this did not constitute "control" within the definition of section
269. Also see Ach v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 342, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1966), for a discussion of "beneficial ownership" as the standard for determining control for purposes
of the application of section 269.
40. Two of the classic cases on taxpayer motivation are United States v. Isham,
84 U.S. 496, 506 (1873),

and Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 468-69 (1935).

Also see Alinco Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 336, 341 (Ct. Cl. 1967):
Few subjects in taxation have been as vexing to the courts as that of tax
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DISTINGUISHING

TAX AVOIDANCE SCHEMES FROM BONA FIDE

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

Congress chose the "principle purpose" test as the mechanism for
distinguishing tax avoidance schemes from bona fide business acquisitions. Section 269 directs the Secretary to disallow deductions secured
by a corporate acquisition if the "principle purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of Federal income tax.'
The Senate Committee Report defines "principal purpose" as one
which "outranks or exceeds in importance any other one purpose. '"42
The "principal purpose" test of section 269 goes a significant step
beyond the "substantial business purpose" doctrine. 43 Gregory suggests
that a transaction with no substantial business purpose may be disregarded.4 4 Section 269 suggests that a transaction with some substantial business purpose may also be disregarded if that business purpose
was not the "principal purpose."

But subsection (b) 45 of the statute

and the Senate Committee Report 46 suggest that if there is some substantial business purpose, there may be partial allowance of the tax
deduction. There is no evidence in the litigated cases that this aspect
of section 269 has been applied to bridge the difference between no
avoidance. There is a wealth of case material, most of it singularly unenlightening except in the context of the peculiar facts in individual cases, particularly those which "exude an odor piscatorial." Rice, Judicial Techniques
in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1953). As Randolph
E. Paul once observed, the subject of tax avoidance "has virtually no philosophical pathways" and visibility is low, indeed. Paul, Restatement of Tax
Avoidance, Studies in Federal Taxation, Callaghan and Co. (1937).
The
frustrating anarchy in the decisions is no doubt due, in part at least, to the
elements of subjectivity which seems inevitably to attend upon the search for a
taxpayer's intention or motivation. There has resulted a rather remarkable
accumulation of conveniently vague maxims, such as the substance, not the
form, of a transaction must control tax incidence, that an unreal or sham
transaction must be disregarded, that what was actually done rather than
what was said is the important criterion, that a taxpayer is privileged to reduce his taxes by means which the law permits, etc. See the discussion and
numerous case citations in Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax
Avoidance, supra at p. 1026 et seq. "General propositions do not decide concrete cases," however, and in the end the particular facts of this case must
bear the responsibility for decision.
41. § 269(a) at supra note 3.
42. S. REP. No. 627, supra note 15 at 1017.
43. An alternative explanation of the relationship between taxpayer motive and the
"substantial business purpose" doctrine is articulated by the United States Court of
Claims in A.P. Green Export Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 390 (Ct. Cl. 1960):
The question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact
what it appears to be in form. A corporate reorganization may be illusory; a
contract of sale may be intended only to deceive others. In such cases the
transaction as a whole is different from its appearance. It is the intent that
controls, but the intent which counts is one which contradicts the apparent
transaction, not the intent to escape taxation.
44. 293 U.S. at 469-70.
45. See supra note 3.
46. S. REP. No. 627, supra note 15 at 1018.
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and some substantial business purpose. There is no case where the
partial allowance scheme of the statute has been applied, though tax47
payers have argued the point.
Of more immediate concern to taxpayers are the practical difficulties
of applying the "principal purpose" test. Application involves a deterruination of the motivations behind an acquisition and a weighing of
the motivations to determine which is the principal one. In United
States v. Donruss4 8 the Supreme Court expressed its skepticism about
the workability of any "principal purpose" test because it necessarily
depends on the "vagaries of corporate motive." 4 On this ground, the
Court refused to construe "the purpose" used in the accumulated profits tax provisions of the Code' 0 to mean "the dominant or principal
purpose." The Court did, however, distinguish section 269, noting
that it explicitly required application of a "principal purpose" test. 5
In United States v. Generes5 2 the Court indicated its willingness to support a "principal purpose" test where it is explicitly required by statute. The Court found no conflict between this position and the skepticism it had expressed in Donruss.53 Based on these precedents the
Supreme Court would probably not entertain a general attack on the
"principal purpose" test of section 269. Such an attack should more
appropriately be taken to the Congress.
In 1954 Congress expressed doubts about the workability of the
"principal purpose" test of section 269. The 1954 recodification
of the law included a substantial amendment to section 269. The
House and Senate Committee Reports note that "the effectiveness of
this provision has been impaired by the difficulty of establishing whether or not tax avoidance was the principal purpose of the acquisition."5 4
47. Thomas E. Snyder v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 823 (1961).
48. 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
49. Id. at 307-308:
Respondent would have us adopt a test that requires that tax avoidance purpose
need be dominant, impelling, or controlling. It seems to us that such a test
would exacerbate the problems that Congress was trying to avoid. Rarely is
there one motive, or even one dominant motive, for corporate decisions.
Numerous factors contribute to the action ultimately decided upon. Respondent's test would allow taxpayers to escape the tax when it is proved that
at least one other motive was equal to tax avoidance. We doubt that such a
determination can be made with any accuracy, and it is certainly one which
will depend almost exclusively on the interested testimony of corporate management.
50. INT. REV. CODE § 531-537.
51. 393 U.S. at 302.
52. 405 U.S. 93 (1973).
53. Id. at 105.
54. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), 1954-3 United States Code
Congressional and Administrative News 4017, 4057. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
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The Congressional solution was subsection (c).55 Subsection (c) raises
a presumption that the principal purpose of an acquisition is tax avoidance whenever the consideration paid is substantially disproportionate
to the adjusted tax basis of the acquired property and the value of the

tax benefits made possible by the acquisition.
mittee Reports,

According to the Com-

Congress believed that subsection (c) would strength-

en enforcement of section 269 by shifting the burden of proof from
the Service to the taxpayer. The effectiveness of the subsection (c)
presumption as an indicator of taxpayer motivation is at best doubtful.
It is more likely to entrap the innocent taxpayer who is unaware of

the tax benefits of his acquisition than the sophisticated taxpayer actually motivated by tax avoidance. 5 7 Its usefulness to the taxpayer

as an indicator of how far he may go without running afoul of section
269 is also doubtful. It has never been clear exactly what constitutes
"substantially disproportionate," and tax benefits unlike most other corporate assets are no bargain to the acquirer if he pays full value for
them.
The Tax Court has made its doubts about subsection (c) very
clear,5 8 and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation has recommended its repeal. 59 The Congressional purpose, shifting the bur2d Sess. (1954), 1954-3 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News
4621, 4670.
55. § 269(c) at supra note 3.
56. H.R. REP. No. 1337, supra note 54 at 4057:
A provision added by your committee has the effect of throwing on the
corporation the burden of proving that there was no purpose of evasion or
avoidance in cases where the consideration paid in acquiring control of another corporation, or corporation property, is substantially disproportionate
to the sum of the adjusted basis of the property and the tax benefits not
otherwise available. This provision will apply to cases where the tax basis
of the property acquired for depreciation and other purposes, together with
the tax value of other tax benefits, such as operating loss carryovers, is substantially greater than the amount paid for the property. Disparities of this
type generally arise where the old basis is continued in the hands of the
new owner. The corporation in such cases is to be required to establish by
a clear preponderance of the evidence that the purpose of the acquisition was
not tax avoidance.
It is believed that the addition of this new provision will strengthen enforcement of existing law in an area that has presented a serious tax-avoidance problem.
There is similar language in S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 54 at 4670.
57. B. BrIrKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 13 at 16-45.
58. See Glen Raven Mills, Inc., 59 T.C. 1, 10 (1972):
We have noted previously that the relationship between the test of section
269(c) and tax avoidance motives is far from clear and that the provision is
merely a "procedural device" which adds weight to the presumption of correctness already existing in the Commissioner's determination.
Also see H.F. Ramsey Co., 43 T.C. 500, 517 (1965).
59. H.R. 25, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 150 (1971). The Joint Committee on Internal
Revenue Taxation explained the purpose of the repeal in its Explanation of H.R. 25
Prepared by The Staff of The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation at 7 (October 13, 1971):
This amendment repeals the presumption of a tax avoidance purpose in cer-
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den of proof, has been achieved by judicial precedent and the procedural rules of the Code.60 Once the Commissioner has determined that
the principal purpose of an acquisition was tax avoidance, the burden
is on the taxpayer to prove that some other purpose was more important than tax considerations. 6 ' The proposed repeal of subsection (c)
would not change this burden and is important to resolution of the
problems surrounding section 269 only insofar as it may provide an
opportunity for full Congressional review of section 269.
Ultimately, the questions of fairness and workability of section 269
can be answered only be reviewing judicial application of the "principal purpose" test. A comprehensive analysis of all the inconsistencies
that appear in section 269 cases would be beyond the scope of this note,
but a few examples will dramatize the difficulties the taxpayer faces
in court. One of the inconsistencies is in the definition of "principal."
Some courts, following the language of the regulation,6 2 require the
taxpayer to prove that tax avoidance was not more important than any
other purpose.63 Others require the taxpayer to prove tax avoidance
was not more important than all other purposes. 6 4 Another inconsistency arises in the use of a "but for" test to measure the taxpayer's intent. According to the regulations the "principal purpose" test is not
a "but for" test. 65 In court, proof that "but for" the tax advantages there
would have been no acquisition supports the presumption that the
principal purpose was tax avoidance.66 But the converse will not defeat
tain cases where the consideration paid for stock or assets of a corporation
is disproportionate to the basis of the assets. The consideration is likely to be
more disproportionate if the parties do not take the tax benefit into account

as an asset to be sold than if they do. Moreover, under general principles of

tax litigation the Commissioner's determination of tax avoidance motive is
presumptively correct, and the burden of proof is already on the taxpayer.
Therefore, this provision has little or no meaning.
60. Tax Court Rules, Rule 32 INT. REV. CODE § 7453 says:
The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise pro-

vided by statute, and except that in respect of any new matter pleaded in his
answer, it shall be upon the respondent.
61. See, e.g., American Pipe and Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 125, 12627 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(a)(2) (1962):

If the purpose to evade or avoid Federal income tax exceeds in importance
any other purpose, it is the principal purpose.
63. See, e.g., Hawaiian Trust Co. Ltd. v. United States, 291 F.2d 761, 765 (9th
Cir. 1961): "[T]o constitute the 'principal purpose' the tax avoidance purpose must
exceed in importance any other purpose." (emphasis added).

64.

See, e.g., Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 1969):

As we view the operation of the statute, there are only two relevant classes of

purposes: tax-avoidance and non-tax-avoidance; the statute applies only if the
former class exceeds the latter.
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(a)(2) (1962):

This does not mean that only those acquisitions fall within the provisions of
section 269 which would not have been made if the evasion or avoidance purpose was not present.

66.
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the presumption.
In most section 269 cases the determination of "principal purpose"
depends upon the credibility of the taxpayer's assertions as to his nontax motives. Some courts measure credibility by economic rationality
while others reject economic rationality as a standard of credibility. 8
Some courts do little more than assert that the taxpayer was or was not
"persuasive." 6
The inconsistencies in the application of the "principal purpose" test
constitute one possible ground for a general challenge to section 269
in the courts or in Congress. Another focus for a challenge could be
the relationship between section 269 and the rest of the Code. Difficulties arise in two situations. First, where the Code allows a benefit
with no mention of motive, section 269 imposes an additional condition
on the taxpayer. Second, where a benefit or deduction is supported
by a substantial business purpose, section 269 may disallow the deduction if there is also a tax avoidance purpose that can be proved to be
principal. In either case section 269 may be working at cross purposes with the rest of the Code.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECTION 269 AND OTHER PROVISIONS
OF THE CODE

It is clear from the House and Senate Committee Reports that the
drafters of section 269 foresaw no conflict with the other provisions of
principal purpose must have been tax avoidance because his asserted non-tax purpose
could have been achieved by means other than acquisition or could not have been

achieved at all. See, e.g., Coastal Oil Storage v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396, 397 (4th
Cir. 1957); J.G. Dudley Co. v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 750, 753-54 (4th Cir. 1962);
Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 1969); Scroll, Inc. v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 1971); Pepi, Inc. v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d
141, 145-47 (2d Cir. 1971); and contra Southeastern Canteen Co. v. Commissioner,
410 F.2d 615, 624-25 (6th Cir. 1969).
67. In his dissent in United States v. Donruss, 393 U.S. 297, 309-13 (1969),
Justice Harlan suggests that a "but for" test would be the fairest test of intent. It
would protect the taxpayer from an equation of knowledge of tax advantages with intent to avoid tax.
68. The distinction appears to depend on whether the taxpayer is arguing that economic absurdity proves that his principal purpose could not have been tax avoidance,
e.g., Commissioner v. British Motor Car Dist. Ltd., 278 F.2d 392, 395 (9th Cir.
1960); R.P. Collins v. United States, 303 F.2d 142, 145-46 (1st Cir. 1962); and F.C.
Publication Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 779, 780 (2d Cir. 1962); or
whether the government is arguing that tax avoidance is the only economically rational
explanation for the acquisition and so tax avoidance must be the principal purpose,
e.g., Brumley-Donaldson Co. v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 501, 505 and 511 (dissent)
(9th Cir. 1971).
69. See, e.g., Brumley-Donaldson Co. v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir.
1971): "persuasive"; Brown Dynalube Co. v. Commissioner, 297 F.2d 915, 917 (4th
Cir. 1962): "The Tax Court did not find the arguments persuasive."; Thomas E. Snyder
Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
823 (1961): "far from convincing"; Urban Redevelopment Corp. v. Commissioner, 294
F.2d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 1961): "in light of the objective evidence, simply unrealistic."
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the Code. The House Committee specified its intent that section 269

"supplement and extend the present provisions of the Code" by preventing "their distortion through tax avoidance. ' 70 The drafters of

section 269 assumed that if the principal purpose of an acquisition was
tax avoidance, any resulting tax benefits would distort tax liability and
should be disallowed.

In some cases the relationship betwen section 269 and other provisions of the Code has been specified by Congress.

In the case of the

multiple surtax exemption the application of section 269 was written

into the Code. 71 In the case of pre-acquisition loss carryovers the role of
section 269 is specified in the Senate Committee Report7 2 accompanying
sections 381 and 382 that allow carryovers where there is continuity of
business activity. 78 Following this clear Congressional mandate 74 courts
have disallowed under section 269 loss carryovers that were in all other
respects allowable under sections 381 and 382.71
Where the Service has enlisted section 269 to disallow other benefits,
courts have been more reluctant to find the "principal purpose" test conclusive.76 Some courts have examined for themselves the relationship
between section 269 and the other Code provisions at issue. For example, in Alinco Life Insurance Company v. United States77 the Court
of Claims refused to sustain a section 269 disallowance of special tax
70. H.R. REP. No. 871, supra note 14 at 938.
71. See. supra note 35.
72. S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 54 at 4923.
If a limitation in this section applies to a net operating loss carryover, section
269, relating to acquisitions made to evade or avoid income tax, shall not also
be applied to such net operating loss carryover. However, the fact that a
limitation under this section does not apply shall have no effect upon whether
section 269 applies.
73. The business continuity test of sections 381 and 382 has also been the source
of some confusion in the courts. In 1957 the Supreme Court in Libson Shops v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957), applied a business continuity test to disallow a carryover
of pre-consolidation losses to post-consolidation profits. Discussion of whether the
"business continuity" test of Libson Shops was the same as that of sections 381 or
382, or was superceded by them, or was to be applied in addition to them seems to
have been resolved in favor of the conclusion that the standards are not the same,
and that section 381 and 382 have superseded Libson Shops. See Coast Quality Construction Corp. v. U.S., 463 F.2d 503, 510-11 (5th Cir. 1972).
74. A subsequent Congressional statement is not technically a part of the legislative
history of section 269 but is construed as an authoritative statement of opinion as to
the relationship between section 269 and sections 381 and 382. See Bobsee Corp. v.
United States, 411 F.2d 231, 237 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1969).
75. See, e.g., Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 25, 37-38 (1969), aff'd,
428 F.2d 49, (7th Cir. 1970); and H.F. Ramsey Co. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 500, 516
(1965).
76. The finding of a principal purpose of tax avoidance is a finding of fact and
reviewable on appeal only if "clearly erroneous." See, e.g., J.T. Slocomb Co. v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 269, 275 (2d Cir. 1964); Luke v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 568,
572 (7th Cir. 1965); and Made Rite Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 357 F.2d 647, 648 (9th
Cir. 1966).
77. 373 F.2d 336 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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treatment for the income of the insurance subsidiary of the taxpayer.
The ground for reversal was the court's finding that the legislative plan
allowing special tax treatment of insurance company income78 was not
meant to depend on the taxpayer's motive for going into the insurance
business."9 The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach in Supreme
Investment Corporationv. United States.80 The court insisted that section 269 must be read "in light of" the rest of the Code and was not
intended to apply to every acquisition having tax benefits. The court
held that in the instant case Congress could not have intended section
269 to apply to a deduction allowed by a section"' that was recently
amended specifically to eliminate the taxpayer's motive as a standard for
2
determination of qualification.
The focus of Alinco and Supreme Investment on the "legislative
plan" of the deduction at issue is of critical importance to understanding
the division in the circuits over post-acquisition net operating loss deductions. The central issue in that division is the relationship between
section 269 and the policies underlying the consolidated return regulations."' The circuits that have held section 269 inapplicable to postacquisition net operating losses have said that allowance may not constitute a distortion of the consolidated return privilege. The circuits
that have sustained application of section 269 have said that it was intended to apply to all credits and allowances and a principal purpose of
tax avoidance is conclusive of distortion. The division in the circuits
makes a Supreme Court test of the application of section 269 to postacquisition losses a tempting prospect. There are, however, at least
three good reasons for caution: Libson Shops;8 4 J.D. & A.B. Spreckels
Company v. Commissioner;8 5 and a careful look at the decisions that
have been made by the circuit courts.
The First Circuit 88 in R.P. Collins v. United States8 7 has taken the
78. INT. REV. CODE § 801.
79. 373 F.2d at 341.
80. 468 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1972).
81. INT. REV. CODE § 334(b)(2).
82. 468 F.2d at 376-78.
83. INT. REV. CODE § 1501-04 and Treas. Reg. § 1.1501-1 - 1.1504-1 (1955-1972).
84. See, supra note 73.
85. 41 B.T.A. 370 (1940). This case was cited in the Committee Reports that accompanied section 269, supra notes 14 and 15. Relying on Gregory v. Helvering the
Board of Tax Appeals held that where a consolidation served no business purpose as
distinguished from a tax-reducing purpose the group was not affiliated within the
meaning of the conslidated return statute.
86. In Newmarket Mfg. Co. v. United States, 233 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 983 (1957), the First Circuit had allowed carryback of post-acquisition
losses where the taxpayer had established that the tax deduction was "otherwise available" and was not a consequence of the acquisition.
87. 303 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1962).
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position that post-acquisition operating loss deductions can be disallowed
on either of two theories. The court construed Section 269 as applicable to all tax benefits arising out of an acquisition "tarred by the
brush of tax avoidance motivation." 8 8 Alternatively the court cited the
rule of J.D. & A.B. Spreckles8 9 that affiliation serving no business
purposes as distinguished from a tax-reducing purpose does not qualify for the privilege of filing a consolidated return. It is not clear whether the court considered the "no business purpose" test and the "principal purpose of tax avoidance" test as equivalents, but it is clear that
it was not prepared to distinguish post- from pre-acquisition loss deductions under section 269. A vigorous dissent questioned the application of a statute designed to discourage a taxpayer from buying the tax
deduction of another to disallow a deduction based on a taxpayer's
own out-of-pocket losses. 90
The Second Circuit expressly followed Collins in J.T. Slocomb v.
Commissioner.9 Slocomb involved disallowance of both pre- and postacquisition losses. The court held that " . . . where the principal purpose of a transaction within the scope of section 269 is to secure a tax
benefit, then any tax benefits which the acquiring corporation or shareholders would not have been entitled to but for the acquisition should
also be disallowed. The disallowance is not restricted to the deduction in which the acquiring parties were primarily interested." 9 2 Three
other Second Circuit cases have sustained disallowance of post-acquisition net operating losses where there has been a finding that the principal purpose of an acquisition was tax avoidance.9"
The Third Circuit has decided cases on both sides of the dispute.
In Elko Really Co. v. Commissioner9 4 post-acquisition net operating
loss deductions were claimed on a consolidated return filed by the corporate owner and manager of several apartment buildings. The court
affirmed the Tax Court disallowance citing the Spreckels rule that substantial business purpose is a condition of qualification for the privilege of filing a consolidated return. Nine years later Frank Ix and Sons
Virginia Corp. v. Commissioner 5 disallowed both pre- and post-acquisi88.

Id. at 146.

89. 41 B.T.A. 370, at 378. See, supra note 85.
90. 303 F.2d at 147-50.
91. 334 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964).

92. Id. at 275.
93. F.C. Publication Liquidating Corp. v. Commissioner, 304 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.

1962); Julius Garfinckel & Co. v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 744 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

379 U.S. 962 (1964); and Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied sub nom. Danica Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 395 U.S. 933 (1969).
94.

95.
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tion loss deductions, but no distinction in treatment was urged on the
court by the taxpayer until the appeal. The court suggested that the
distinction would receive careful hearing if it were properly raised. 6
It was raised and considered the next year in Herculite Protective Fabrics
Corp. v. Commissioner.9 7 The Third Circuit held in that case that only
the pre-acquisition loss deduction could be disallowed under section
269. Since the Herculite decision does not discuss the Elko decision, it is
not clear what relationship the Third Circuit would find between them.
It is clear that in the Third Circuit section 269 cannot reach post-acquisition losses where, as in Herculite, the deduction is found to be "in no
sense artificial and represents no unjust enrichment of the taxpayer."9'
This holding constitutes a double standard for application of section
269. There is one standard, "principal purpose of tax avoidance,"
in the cases of pre-merger carryovers and multiple surtax exemptions
where the legislative mandate is clear. There is a different standard,
that of Herculite, "in the absence of a clear legislative mandate."9 9
The most recent post-acquisition loss case was decided last year in
the Fifth Circuit. Hall Paving Co. v. United States'00 involved a net
operating loss deduction claimed on a consolidated return filed by a
road paving company that had purchased five bowling alleys. The
district court"" had ruled that section 269 could not reach these postacquisition operating losses as a matter of law. The court of appeals
remanded for a finding on the question of principal purpose. Relying
heavily on the legislative history of section 269, the Fifth Circuit found
the "clear legislative mandate" for disallowance of post-acquisition
losses that the Third Circuit was unable to find. The court cited the
House Committee's reference to "anticipated expense of other deductions" 10 2 and the Senate Committee's reference to "prospective losses.' 10 3 It further noted the Senate Committee's explicit reference to
the Spreckels case and the consolidated return provisions14 as support96.
97.
98.

Id. at 874.
387 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 476.

99. Id.

[D]isallowance of the carryover of losses caused by the operation of the busiiness after acquisition constitutes a penalty that should not be imposed in the
absence of a clear legislative mandate. Certainly such post-acquisition losses
would have been deductible by way of carryover had not pre-acquisition
losses also been claimed.
100. 471 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1973).
101. 338 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
102. H.R. REP. No. 871, supra note 14 at 938.
103. S. REP. No. 627, supra note 15 at 1017.
104. Id.
The National Securities and Spreckels cases cited above aptly illustrate such
nonconformity, violating in those cases the basic policies of the deduction
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ing the government's contention that section 269's principal purpose
test was intended to supersede the "no business purpose" test that had
been applied in Spreckels.10 5 The court admitted that it had taken the
opposite approach in Supreme Investment Co.' 6 the year before. In
that case the court had looked to the legislative plan of the deduction to
determine the limits of section 269. In Hall the court was looking to
section 269 to determine how the legislative plan of the deduction was
to be construed.
On the issue of the relationship between section 269 and the consolidated return regulations, Hall placed the Fifth Circuit in direct conflict with the Sixth. The Sixth Circuit took its stand in 1964 in
Zanesville Investment Co. v. Commissioner.°7 As in Hall only postacquisition net operating losses had been deducted on the consolidated
return. The losses had been generated in attempting to open a
new face on an existing coal mine that was one of several enterprises
owned by a profitable newspaper publisher. There had been no change
in the ownership of the controlling parent corporation. The acquisition consisted in the transfer of the mine from one to another of the
commonly owned subsidiaries.
The court carefully distinguished
Spreckels and Elko Realty on the facts. Both of those cases were read
as involving built-in' 0 rather than post-acquisition net operating
losses.' 0 9 The court concluded that the test for application of section
269 was not only the motive of the taxpayer but also the relationship of
the case to the legislative plan of the deduction challenged. The court
reviewed the legislative history of the consolidated return"1 ' and concluded:
In this case, it may well be, as the Tax Court found, that the
taxpayer desired to offset anticipated losses against income; but
there is no evidence that such objective is violative of the legislaprovisions and in the Spreckels case, the consolidated returns provisions. The
test of this nonconformity is, as was indicated in Higgins v. Smith, whether
the transaction or a particular factor thereof "distorts the liability of the particular taxpayer" when the "essential nature" of the transaction or factor is
examined in the light of the "legislative plan" which the deduction or credit
is intended to effectuate.
105. 471 F.2d at 264 n.8.
106. 468 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1972).
107. 335 F.2d 507 (6th Cir. 1964).
108. Id. at 510. Built-in losses are defined as losses accruing prior to the acquisition but realized after the acquisition.
109. Id.at 510-11.
110. One of the difficulties in determining the legislative plan for the consolidated return privilege is that INT. REv. CODE § 1502 delegates to the Secretary authority to make the necessary regulations. These regulations do make provision for special
treatment of post-acquisition net operating losses.
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tive plan which permits just that in an effort to counter-balance
profits with losses." 1
The disallowance was reversed.
The Seventh Circuit has sustained disallowance of post-acquisition
operating losses in two cases. Luke v. Commissioner' 2 expressly followed Collins in refusing to distinguish between pre- and post-acquisition losses. The court found the post-acquisition losses to be a necessary incident of an overall plan and therefore tainted by the tax avoidance motive. Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v. Commissioner"'1 also refused to distinguish between pre- and post-acquisition losses. The case involved a pre-1954 tax year and deductions were
disallowed under the Libson Shops" 4 rule without reference to section
269.
There have been no true post-acquisition loss cases in the Ninth
Circuit, but two cases involving built-in losses did discuss the consolidated return regulations. American Pipe & Steel v. Commissioner"5
affirmed a Tax Court holding that because the "principal purpose" of
the transaction was tax avoidance, the taxpayer could not qualify for
the privilege of filing a consolidated return under the Spreckels rule.
In Hawaiian Trust Co. Ltd. v. United States"' the court concluded that
the principal purpose of the transaction had not been tax avoidance.
In dicta it implied that the "principal purpose" test of section 269 and
the "no business purpose other than tax avoidance" test of Spreckels
17
were interchangeable."
The Tax Court has joined both sides of the issue."18 In Temple
Square Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner'" the court disallowed a deduction
for post-acquisition operating losses. It read the language and legislative history of section 269 to apply to any deduction that would not
otherwise be available once the acquisition is found to have had a
principal purpose of tax avoidance. 120 Seven years later in Industrial
111.

335 F.2d at 514.

113.

409 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1969).

114.
115.
116.

See supra note 73.
243 F.2d 125 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957).
291 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1961).

112.

351 F.2d 568 (7th Cir. 1965).

117. Id. at 769:
Where there is in fact no business purpose and the sole or principal purpose
is tax evasion, the benefits of a consolidated return may be denied under either section [269] or the Spreckels rule.

118. See Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970) explaining that When there is a split
in the circuits, the Tax Court will decide an issue in accord with the circuit to which
an appeal will go if an appeal is taken.

119.
120.

36 T.C. 88 (1961).
Id. at 95.
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Suppliers, Inc. v. Commissioner12 1 the Tax Court, without reference to
the earlier decision, held that section 269 is not applicable to net operating losses incurred subsequent to the acquisition, whatever the taxpayer's
motive.

1 22

The Tax Court in Industrial Suppliers, the Third Circuit in Herculite and the Sixth Circuit in Zanesville have held that as a matter of
law section 269 does not reach post-acquisition net operating losses.
The Zanesville decision is the narrowest holding that post-affiliation
operating losses "standing by themselves" are not within the reach of
section 269.122 The First, Second, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have
held that where the principal purpose is tax avoidance, section 269
may be applied to disallow any benefit resulting from the acquisition.
These circuits make no distinction between pre- and post-acquisition
loss deductions. To complicate the division in the circuits the Third
Circuit in Elko Realty and the Ninth Circuit in American Pipe have
held that, regardless of section 269, post-acquisition losses may be
barred under the Spreckels rule that a consolidation made for no business purpose other than tax reduction does not qualify for a consolidated
tax return.
A carefully drawn post-acquisition case could bring the division of
the circuits to the Supreme Court for resolution. The strongest case
for application is probably the drafters' reliance on Spreckels and the
fact that the consolidated return provisions, allowing the application of
post-acquisition losses to post-acquisition gains, that were relied on in
Zanesville are regulations authorized but not written by Congress. There
is no clearly articulated "legislative plan" as was found in Alinco and in
Supreme Investment. The strongest arguments against application are
probably the policy and economic considerations raised by the dissent
in Collins. The difficulty with these arguments is that it is easiest for the
Court to rely on construction of legislative intent and most difficult for
the Court to rely on policy considerations. Ultimately it is for the legislature, not the courts, to decide whether the allowance of post-acquisition
losses is consistent with the purposes of the consolidated return. It is
for the Congress to determine, as they did in the case of the loss carryover, whether an objective test will serve the ends of tax policy better
than the subjective test of taxpayer motive.
There are two realistic possibilities for Congressional review of section 269. The recommended repeal of subsection (c) may bring sec121.

50 T.C. 635 (1968).

122.

Id. at 649-50.

123.

335 F.2d 507 at 511.
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tion 269 up for review. Alternatively, continuing interest in conglomerate acquisitions may provide the impetus for a more comprehensive
review of all the Code provisions that affect acquisitions including section 269. Certainly Congressional action would clarify the issue for
both the Supreme Court and the taxpayer. Until there is such a review,
section 269 will continue to be a Catch-22 for any business carefully
planning an acquisition with tax advantages in mind. Until there is
such a review, the Court could do little more than dull the edge of section 269 by holding it inapplicable to post-acquisition net operating
losses. The Court resolution of that issue cannot resolve the basic
problems of dependence on the subjective "principal purpose test" or
the failure of the section 269 sanction to distinguish between some
and no business purpose. Perhaps of greatest concern is that Court
resolution of the post-acquisition loss question will not restrict efforts
to extend the reach of section 269 in other directions to disallow other
benefits that arise directly or indirectly from acquisition or incorporation.
CYNTHIA KAP PUS
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